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The Constitutionality of Restricting the Use of Social Media: Flash Mob Protests Warrant First
Amendment Protections
Michael J. Fitzpatrick*

I.

Introduction

Flash mobs are a phenomenon that has recently gained significant popularity among
entertainers and activists alike. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a flash mob is
comprised of "a group of people summoned (as by e-mail or text message) to a designated
location at a specified time to perform an indicated action before dispersing." 1 As its definition
suggests, flash mobs are intrinsically linked to social media? This association is primarily a
result of flash mobbers' reliance on text messaging and other social-networking technology to
both organize and rally support for their particular cause or performance.3 Additionally, social
media technology plays an important role during the commission of a flash mob.4

Social

networks enable flash mobbers to instantaneously communicate with one another, thereby
empowering participants to immediately change venue, or, in some instances, evade authorities.5
Generally, flash mobs are associated with amusing performance acts that take place in
highly public areas such as train stations, parks, or town squares. 6 Such an association is
understandable, as flash mobs were initially used almost exclusively for entertainment purposes,
• J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Boston College. The author would
like to thank the Seton Hall Law Review, Melissa Ferrara, and Professor Ronald Riccio for their help in drafting this
Comment.
1
Flash Mob Definition, MERRIAM~WEBSTER.COM, http://www.meniam~webster.com/dictionary/flash%20mob (last
visited Nov. 6, 2011).
2
See id.
3
J. David Goodman, Debate Over Social Media Incitement as Flash Mobs Strike, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2011,
http:/lthelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/debat~over~social~media~incitement~as~flash~mobs~

strike/?scp= 1&sq=Flash%20Mob&st=cse.
4
Id.
5
Id
6
Sheila Shayon, Flash Mob Trend Spawns A New Social Media Industry, Social Media, BRANDCHANNEL.COM (Aug.
23, 2011 ), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post/20 11/08/23/Flash~Mob~Trend~Spawns~A~New~Social~Media~
Industry .aspx.

with large groups of performers organizing spontaneou~ choreographed dances, songs, and other
performances in public areas? In reality, however, flash mobs encompass a much broader range
of activities. 8 Despite flash mobs' innocuous beginnings, their scope of use has evolved, as flash
mobs are now utilized for more substantial purposes. 9 In fact, flash mobs have been linked to
acts of crime, violence, and public disorder. 10 For example, in 2011 alone, flash mobs were
linked to a protest in San Francisco, riots in both Philadelphia and London, and robberies in
Maryland. 11
As flash mobs are increasingly utilized for more sinister purposes, a debate has emerged
regarding how flash mobs should be regulated and whether such regulations unconstitutionally
impinge upon participants' First Amendment rights. 12 Perhaps the most controversial issue
surrounding this debate concerns governmental regulation of flash mobbers' systematic usage of
social media. 13 On the one hand, police forces and other governmental authorities argue that
violent flash mobs are a byproduct of flash mobbers' pervasive use of "social media ... like
Twitter and Facebook and instant messaging services ... [as] organizing tools for mayhem." 14
Because flash mob participants' rely on social media to recruit support and evade authorities,
7

See e.g., ShareATT,AT&T Network TV Commercial--Flash Mob, YoUTUBE (May 9, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd8ppkOUCx8 (showing a television commercial of a planned flash mob dance
at a train station. This clip also displays flash mobs' close relationship to social media, albeit in a humorous
fashion); CulturePub, Historicjlashmob in Antwerp train station, do re mi, YouTUBE (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQLCZOG202k (video of a choreographed flash mob dance in an Antwerp train
station); ImprovEverywhere, lmprov Everywhere: Frozen Grand Central, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwMj3PJDxuo&ob=av3e (showing a flash mob performance where hundreds of
people spontaneously froze in Grand Central Station, New York City. This video also shows how flash mobs can
disrupt station activities); discoverireland, St Patrick's Day Flashmob in Sydney by Tourism Ireland, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxEB48jY3F8 (depicting a choreographed flash mob dance in
Central Station, Sydney, Australia).
8
Shayon, supra note 6.
9Jd
10 Jd.

Illd
Justin Silverman, BART Phone Blackout: Did the S.F. Transit Agency Violate Free Speech Protections, SUFFOLK
MEDIA LAw (Aug. 27, 2011 ), http://suffolkmedialaw .com/20 11/08/27/bart-phone-blackout-did-the-s-f-transitagency-violate-free-speech-protections/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
13
Goodman, supra note 3.
12

14Jd.

authorities maintain that they can more easily suppress flash mobs by restricting mobbers' access
to social media. 15 In contrast, proponents of flash mobs and free speech activists believe that
"social media doesn't organize riots. People organize riots." 16 Following this logic, violent flash
mobs are born out of violent people rather than social media. 17 As a result, activists argue that
restricting a flash mob's usage of social media violates the First Amendment by censoring
expressive speech in a protected forum. 18
Possibly the most indicative manifestation of this debate occurred on August 11, 2011
when the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), which is the San Franciscan public subway system
authority, completely shut down cell phone and wireless service to their train platforms to
prevent a planned flash mob protest. 19 This particular flash mob protest was in response to the
BART Police Department's (BART PD) July 3, 2011 shooting of Charles Hill, a homeless train
passenger.20 Hill's death sparked a massive public outcry against BART PD, with protestors
vigorously demanding that the BART PD be reformed and/or disbanded due to their violent track
record? 1 On July 11, 2011, protestors flooded BART's Civic Center Station to voice their
displeasure about the shooting?2 The protest primarily took place on BART's train platforms
and resulted in substantial disturbances to BART's train system. 23 Because the protest was

15Jd.
16Jd
17
See ld
18
Silverman, supra note 12.
19
Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse 'Flash' Protest, BART Cuts Riders' Cell Service. Is that Legal?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0812/To-defuse-flash-protestBART-cuts-riders-cell-service.-Is-that-legal.
20
ld; see also Maria L. La Ganga & Lee Romney, Protest Closes 4 BART Stations, Leaving Commuter Crowd
Stranded, Local, LA TIMES, Aug. 15,2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/15/locallla-me-bart-anonymousprotest-20 11 0816.
21
La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20. BART faced a similar public reaction after a BART officer shot an unarmed
passenger in 2009. Zusha Elinson & Shoshana Walter, Latest BART Shooting Prompts New Discussion ofReforms,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 16,2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/us/17bcbart.html?pagewanted=all.
22
Silverman, supra note 12.
23
ld. (reporting that the July 11 flash mob caused congestion on BART platforms, several train delays, and the
partial and complete shutdown of various BART stations).

spontaneous and largely organized and perpetuated through social media, it is characterized as a
flash mob protest.24
One month later, BART officials learned of a similar flash mob protest scheduled for
August 11th?5 To ensure passenger safety and prevent similar disturbances to the July 11th
protest, BART officials preemptively disabled BART's train platforms' wireless-networks? 6
Perhaps due to the integral role that social networking plays in organizing and sustaining flash
mob protests, no protest took place on August 11th.27 This unprecedented tactic in shutting down
wireless service provoked an enormous reaction from protestors and free speech activists alike,
who believed that the shutdown unconstitutionally violated protestors' First Amendment right to
free speech.28 Consequently, activists promised to continue to protest at BART stations until
BART decided to "back away from their policy of cellphone [sic] censorship."29
This Comment will investigate the constitutionality of regulating flash mob protests via
social media restrictions. This analysis will examine the relevant issues and law associated with
such regulations and will demonstrate how the law should be applied practically, using the
BART wireless-network shutdown as a case study.
Part II will begin by exploring whether a flash mob can qualify as expressive speech and
thereby receive First Amendment protection. This section will analyze both the communicative
and non-communicative elements of flash mobs, which are crucial to determining whether a
flash mob is within the purview of the First Amendment. Additionally, Part II will investigate
the allegation that a flash mob protest's use of social media frequently constitutes incitement,
24

See Flash mob Definition, supra note 1.
Jonsson, supra note 19.
26Id
27Jd
28
Zusha Elinson, After Cellphone Action, BARTfaces Escalating Protests, U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,2011,

25

http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/08/21/us/21 bcbart.html? r= 1&scp= 1&sq=BART&st=cse.
~M

-

which is defined as unprotected speech that advocates for, and is likely to produce, imminent
lawless action. 30 Part III will conduct a forum analysis to determine (1) what forum(s) are
implicated by flash mob protests, and (2) what the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny is in such
forum(s). This analysis is crucial, as "[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all
places and at all times."31 Part IV will consider whether preemptive access restrictions to social
media networks constitute prior restraints on expressive speech, which carry a "heavy
presumption against [their] constitutional validity."32 In Near v. State ofMinnesota, the Supreme
Court held that if speech is to be punished, it may only be punished after the speaker has
spoken.33

Because prior restraints are among the most heinous restrictions on speech, the

governmental justification for such a restraint must fulfill a very stringent three-part test. 34
Immediately following each Part, this comment will apply the relevant issues and law to
the BART situation.

Ultimately, after thoroughly analyzing all germane factors and

circumstances and responding to all relevant counter-arguments these portions will demonstrate
that social media regulations are subject to the highest judicial scrutiny, and, as a result, BART's
wireless shutdown unconstitutionally censored protected speech.
Finally, Part V will synthesize each Part, concluding that although the constitutionality of
flash mob regulations must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, completely restricting a flash
mob's use of social media technology generally results in a First Amendment violation. In sum,
this Comment will argue that provided that a flash mob protest intends to communicate a
constitutionally protected message that is likely to be understood, preemptive wireless and social
media restrictions should be struck down as unconstitutional.
30

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,799 (1985).
32
Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
33 ld
31

34

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).

II.

When Do Flash Mob Protests Constitute Protected Speech?

In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protections do not
"end at the spoken or written word."35 Consequently, expressive conduct may receive First
Amendment protections. 36 Accordingly, flash mobs that are intended to convey communicative
expression meet the first criterion for constitutional protection.
A. Expressive Conduct and the 0 'Brien Test
In United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."37 As a result, even when conduct
expresses an idea or opinion, it does not automatically receive the full protection of the First
Amendment.38 Moreover, to receive any First Amendment protection, the expressive conduct
must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication ...."39 To determine whether
conduct is sufficiently communicative, the Supreme Court has asked whether "[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."40 Therefore, expressive conduct must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 41
Using this rationale, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the following conduct is
sufficiently expressive and qualifies for First Amendment protection: the wearing of black
35

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989).
See id
37
U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968); see generally James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message
from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (2008).
38
See id
39
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405,409 (1974)).
40
Johnson, 491 U.S. at404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at410).
41
This is an important consideration. Although one flash mob may be dee~ed protected expressive conduct, this
does not mean that all flash mobs are protected expressive conduct. For example, a flash mob protesting for a
particular cause will more than likely be deemed communicative in nature. In contrast, a flash mob robbery, where
the participants spontaneously loot a shop or store in an effort to steal and evade police, certainly is not
communicative in any way. Therefore, regardless of what conclusions are drawn about the BART flash mob
protest, such conclusions are not indicative of how all flash mob protests should be treated.
36

armbands to protest the Vietnam War,42 sit-ins against segregation,43 and "picketing about a wide
variety of causes."44

In contrast to protected spoken and written speech, the Government has more freedom to
restrict protected expressive conduct.45 A less stringent standard is justified because expressive
conduct is usually comprised of both "speech and nonspeech" elements.46 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 47 As a result, to restrict expressive
conduct the Government must· prove that: (1) its regulation is within the Government's
constitutional powers; (2) the regulation serves an "important or substantial governmental
interest;" (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of a particular idea or
opinion; and (4) the regulation is not "greater than is essential" to further such an interest. 48 In

Johnson, the Supreme Court emphasized that a restriction or regulation may not "proscribe
particular conduct because it has expressive elements.',49
The O'Brien case effectively illustrates how to apply this test. In O'Brien, the Supreme
Court held that a statute that punished the defendant for destroying his draft card did not violate
the First Amendment because the statute merely condemned the "noncommunicative aspect of
42

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141- 142 (1966).
44
See e.g., Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding
that picketing, which carries both elements of speech and conduct, that is "carried on in a location open generally to
the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First
Amendmenf'); U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (fmding that "[t]here is no doubt that as a general matter
£eaceful picketing and leafleting are expressing activities involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment.").
5
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
46
U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
47 Jd.
48
Jd. at 377 ("[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of :free expression; and ifthe incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
49
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
43

[his] conduct."50 The defendant, who set his draft card on fire to display his anti-war sentiment,
argued that the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon his right to freely express his opposition
to the war and the draft. 51 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the
government had a substantial interest in preventing harm to "the smooth and efficient
functioning of the Selective Service System," which required each draftee to have and preserve
their draft certificates. 52 Thus, when the defendant destroyed his certificate, he frustrated a
substantial governmental interest. 53 As a result, the defendant was held accountable for the
noncommunicative impact of his conduct-frustrating the Selective Service System-rather than
his display of anti-war sentiment. 54 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that (1) the
government had a "substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective
Service certificates," (2) the statute narrowly protected this interest by only condemning the
noncomunicative elements of divergent conduct, (3) the defendant frustrated the Government's
interest by burning his draft card, and (4) the statute only incidentally limited the defendant's
expression. 55
In the context of flash mobs, the 0 'Brien test reveals an important consideration: flash

mobs must be considered on a case-by-case basis. For instance, a flash mob robbery, which
entails numerous people spontaneously looting a particular store or neighborhood, certainly is
not imbued with any communicative elements. 56 Flash mob protests, on the other hand, almost
always intend to communicate a message.

Despite this, each flash mob protest must be

individually analyzed to ascertain whether the protest's message is likely to be understood,
50

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381- 82.
ld. at 381.
52
Id at 382.
53 ld.
54ld.
55 ld.
56
Shay on, supra note 6.
51

whether the government has a significant interest in regulating the noncommunicative elements
of the protest, and whether the government furthers that interest in a fashion that only
incidentally limits the protesters' expression.
B. Incitement
Many opponents to flash mobs argue that flash mobbers use social media to incite
imminent lawless action. 57 To explore this issue, it is essential to understand that the right to free
speech "is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances."58 In Chaplinsky v. State ofNew
Hampshire, the Supreme Court stated, ''there are certain well-defmed and narrowly limited

classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problems."59

Among these unprotected classes of speech are incitement, 60

fighting words, 61 libel, 62 and obscenity. 63 Thus, by arguing that flash mob protests constitute
incitement,

opponen~s

are espousing the belief that flash mobs, and their use of social media,

may be freely restricted and regulated by governmental authorities. 64
The seminal case regarding incitement is Schenck v. United States. 65 In Schenck, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Espionage Act-a World War I statute that
proscribed speech attempting to obstruct the wartime draft and "cause insubordination in the
military and naval forces of the United States. " 66 Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were

57

Silverman, supra note 12.
Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568,571 (1942).
59
ld at 371 -72.
60
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
61
Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15,20 (1971) (ruling fighting words, or "those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent
reaction," may be freely banned without "a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances").
62
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,268 (1964) (fmding that printing a libelous publication about a citizen,
who is not a public official, is not protected by the Constitution).
63
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,743 (holding that patently offensive sexual and excretory speech is not
protected by the First Amendment).
64
Silverman, supra note 12.
65
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
66
Jd at 48-49.
58

indicted under the Espionage Act for printing and distributing a pamphlet that advocated for
enlisted men and drafted men to forsake their duty to the United States Army. 67 Schenck and
Baer argued that the Espionage Act unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment because the
Act discriminately punished actions based on their viewpoint. 68
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." 69

As a result, the Supreme Court

concluded that when words create a '"clear and present danger" to the public, those words are not

°

afforded constitutional protection. 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that wartime
speech is much more likely to create a clear and present danger; therefore, such speech is not
afforded as much protection as speech during peacetime. 71 Consequently, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment because speech that
advocates for the obstruction of military recruitment is likely to create a clear and present danger
to military conscription. 72
Although the clear and present danger doctrine was progressively weakened over time, it
governed incitement for nearly fifty years. 73 In 1969, however, the Supreme Court abrogated
clear and present danger with the Brandenburg v. Ohio ruling. 74 In Brandenburg, the Supreme
Court considered whether the leader of the Ku Klux Klan's (KKK) First Amendment rights were
unconstitutionally infringed when he was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism

67

ld at 49, 51.
Jd at 51.
69
ld at 52.
70
ld (emphasis added).
71
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
72
ld at 53.
73
See e.g., Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298,319 (1957) (holding that mere advocacy of a forcible overthrow of the
government as an abstract principle does not violate the clear and present danger test); see also Andrianna D.
Kastanek, From Hit Man to a Military Takeover ofNew York city: The Evolving Effects ofRice Paladin Enterprises
on Internet Censorship, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 383,386-394 (2004).
74
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 444,444 (1969).
68

statute. 75 This statute restricted speech that advocated for "the duty, necessity, or propriety of
crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform."76 The KKK leader's conviction was based on him delivering a
fanatical speech that lobbied for the KKK to take "revengent" action against the government and
for KKK sympathizers to march upon Congress. 77 In addition, numerous members of the
audience held firearms and burned crosses. 78
Rather than apply the clear and present danger standard, the Supreme Court adopted a
new test, concluding that the "constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and it is likely to incite or
produce such action."79 Consequently, the Supreme Court introduced a much stricter, twopronged standard. 80 Under the Brandenburg test, inciting speech must advocate for lawless
action that is (1) imminent and (2) likely to occur. 81 Applying this standard to the facts, the
Supreme Court found that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act was unconstitutional because the
statute punished ''mere advocacy. " 82
This standard draws a distinction between mere advocacy and preparation. 83 In Noto v.
United States, the Supreme Court distinguished "preparing a group for violent action" from

75ld.
76
Jd at444-45
77
Id at 445-47
78Jd
79
Jd at 447 (emphasis added); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (Black, J., concurring) (fmding that the clear
and present danger test should be abrogated because it has been "manipulated to crush what [Justice] Brandeis called
'[t]he fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions' by
argument and discourse even in times of war") (quoting Pierce v. U.S., 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1947) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
80
See id
81
Brandenburg, 354 U.S. at 447.
82
Jd at 449.
83
Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290,297-98 (1960).

abstractly teaching that violence is a moral propriety or necessity. 84 As a result, a speaker's
advocacy or encouragement of violent tactics does not constitute imminent lawless action unless
such advocacy can be considered preparation, which arises when it is reasonably certain that
lawless or violent action will occur. 85 According to the Supreme Court, "to rule otherwise would
ignore the 'profound national commitment' that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. '" 86
Proper application of the Brandenburg doctrine requires an understanding of the term
"lawless action." According to the Ninth Circuit, "lawless action" under the Brandenburg
doctrine is distinguishable from "civil disobedience." 87 In White v. Lee, the Ninth Circuit held
that
"[i]mminent lawless action," as used in Brandenburg, means
violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot. Peaceful
speech, even speech that urges civil disobedience, is fully
protected by the First Amendment. Were this not the case, the
right of Americans to speak out peacefully on issues and to petition
their government would be sharply circumscribed. 88
Although White draws a distinction between lawless action and civil disobedience, the
difference between "physical disorder in the nature of a riot" and civil disobedience remains
unclear.

Black's Law Dictionary clarifies, defining civil disobedience as "a deliberate but

nonviolent act of lawbreaking to call attention to a particular law or set of laws believed by the
actor to be of questionable legitimacy or morality." 89 Therefore, civil disobedience does not

84

Jd.
85Jd.

86
87

N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).

88Jd
89
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Civil Disobedience (9th ed. 2009); see also ARCHIBALD COX, JR. ET AL., CNIL
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 169 ( 1968) ("Social protests and even civil disobedience serve the
law's need for growth.").

qualify as lawless action merely because violations of law occur. 90 Rather, the crux of civil
disobedience is the existence of a nonviolent act that calls attention to some alleged
immorality.91 In contrast, Black's defines the term riot-the nature of lawless action-as "[a]n
unlawful disturbance of the peace by an assemblage of three or more persons acting with a
common purpose in a violent or tumultuous manner that threatens or terrorizes the public or an
institution."92 Thus, the primary difference between civil disobedience and a riot is violence and
tumultuousness rather than illegality.
As a result, under Brandenburg, inciting speech is speech that ( 1) is directed toward
producing imminent lawless, or riotous, action that (2) is likely to produce such action. Thus,
when applied to flash mob protests' use of social media, the most important inquiries are (1)
what conduct or measures the speech is advocating for, and (2) whether such actions constitute
lawless action or civil disobedience.
C. Application to BART
1.) Did the Planned BART Flash Mob Protest Constitute Expressive Speech?
To receive constitutional protection, the August 11 1h planned flash mob protest must be
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication ...." 93 As such, the planned protest must
be a vehicle for communicating a particular message. 94 Additionally, it must be likely that this
message will be "understood by those who viewed it."95

90 ld.
91ld.
92

ed. 2009).
Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
94ld
95 ld
93

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Riot (9th

Applying these principles to BART, the BART flash mobbers intended to use the flash
mob as a vehicle for expressing their opposition to BART PD's violent reputation. 96 In fact, the
planned protest was part of a massive movement known as "No Justice, No BART," which was
organized to call the public's attention to BART PD's heinous and violent actions. 97 Therefore,
the flash mob protest was aimed at communicating a particularized message. Furthermore, this
message was likely to be understood by those who viewed it. This is evident through the July
11th protest, which featured flash mobbers wearing bloody T-shirts to convey BART PD's

violent track record, numerous chants calling for the BART PD's disbandment, and countless
signs opposing violence against BART passengers like Charles Hill. 98 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recognized picketing as sufficiently expressive conduct. 99 As a result, the planned
flash mob protest qualifies as expressive conduct that may receive First Amendment protection.
Although the planned flash mob protest qualifies as protected expressive conduct, the
government may nevertheless be entitled to restrict it. 100 To begin this examination, it is
important to note that the planned protest had both speech and nonspeech elements. 101 The
speech elements encapsulated the protestors' opposition to BART PD. These elements were
disseminated via the protestors picketing on train platforms as well as their posts on social
networking forums like Facebook, Twitter, and even through text messaging and email. 102 The
nonspeech elements, on the other hand, included causing delays to the BART system, causing

96

Vivian Ho, BART: Next time, 'zero tolerance'for disruptions, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 13,2011,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/20 11107/13/BAP51K9JQR.DTL.
91Jd
98
La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20.
99
See generally Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
100
Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,406 (1989).
101
U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
102
See Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1 (as its defmition suggests, flash mobs are intrinsically linked to social
media. Social media is crucial to flash mobs in that they allow flash mobbers to organize and publicize their cause
to enormous amounts of people).

temporary station closures, and, most importantly, endangering BART passengers' and
employees' safety. 103
The next step for determining whether the BART protest constitutes expressive speech
requires application of the 0 'Brien test. The 0 'Brien test is comprised of four parts: (1) the
government regulation "is within the constitutional power of the Government"; (2) "it furthers an
important or substantial government interest"; (3) "the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression"; and (4) the incidental restriction on "First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."104 If all four elements are
satisfied then the government may regulate the flash mob protest. BART likely fails the first
prong of the 0 'Brien test because the regulation unconstitutionally restricts access to a
traditional public forum-BART's wireless and the social networks. 105 This point, however, will
be analyzed in greater detail in Part III.E.3 below. 106
Next, it is questionable whether BART satisfies the second prong of the O'Brien test.
While BART certainly has an important and substantial governmental interest in preserving the
safety of its passengers, it is arguable whether that interest is furthered by BART shutting down
the wireless-network.

According to BART, the wireless-network shutdown prevented

congestion on the train platforms, thereby preserving passenger and personnel safety. 107 In
addition, BART was concerned that the flash mob would cause substantial train delays and
station closures. 108 As seen through the July 11th protest, these concerns were legitimate, and
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BART had an important interest in ensuring that they did not occur again. 109 Despite this, the
wireless shutdown only marginally furthered that interest, if at all.
According to an August 20, 2011 letter from BART officials to their passengers, BART
dismantled wireless service because it received the following information:
[Protestors] would be giving and receiving instructions to
coordinate their activities via cell phone after their arrival on the
train platforms at more than one station. Individuals were
instructed to text the location of police officers so that the
organizers would be aware of officer locations and response
times. The overall information about the planned protest led
BART to conclude that the planned action constituted a serious and
imminent threat to the safety of BART passengers and personnel ..
110

As a result, the wireless shutdown would not be effective until after the protest had begun-after
the BART patrons and personnel were supposedly in danger. Notwithstanding, a court would
likely rule that the wireless shutdown alone adequately advanced the government's interest in
public safety. However, in addition to the wireless shutdown, BART assigned over 120 extra
uniformed police officers and operations personnel to their train stations in preparation of the
flash mob." 111 Consequently, BART provided ample security to quickly and efficiently suppress
the planned flash mob without the wireless shutdown.

Ultimately, the shutdown was a

superfluous restriction that was not needed to further the government's interest in public safety.
As a result, the wireless restriction is vulnerable to the 0 'Brien test's second prong.
BART easily satisfies the third prong of the O'Brien test as the shutdown was entirely
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. If BART's letter is accepted as true, its sole
motivation for the wireless shutdown was to preserve passenger and personnel safety. 112
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Consequently, BART implied that they would take similar preemptive action against any
planned protest that could potentially endanger passenger or personnel safety regardless of its
message. 113 Presumably, BART would have taken the same or similar actions if it learned of a
planned flash mob defending BART PD. As a result, BART's wireless shutdown was likely
unrelated to the suppression of free speech.
As to O'Brien's fourth and final prong, BART likely cannot carry its burden. To satisfy
the last prong of the 0 'Brien test, an incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms may
not be "greater than is essential" to further the Government's interest. 114 In the instant situation,
the amount of expression that is censored by BART's wireless shutdown substantially outweighs
the extent that BART's interest in public safety is furthered. To illustrate, every individual on
BART's platforms, regardless of whether he or she intended to participate in the protest, was
denied access to BART's wireless and social networks. 115 As a result, an enormous amount of
expression was censored as passengers were prevented from calling, texting, tweeting, posting,
or communicating in any way with people outside the platform areas. Furthermore, BART's
bolstered security diluted the wireless shutdown's safety benefits. 116 As a result, the shutdown
censored a massive amount of expression while only marginally furthering BART's safety
interest. Thus, the restriction had more than an incidental effect on protected expression, thereby
failing 0 'Brien's final prong.
Ultimately, BART does not have a very good chance of passing the 0 'Brien test. Thus,
the planned flash mob likely constitutes protected expressive conduct under the First
Amendment.
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2.) Can the Planned Protest be Characterized as Incitement?
Under the Brandenburg test, the BART flash mob protest and, more specifically, the
protestors' use of social media, did not constitute inciting speech. In BART's August 20th letter
to its passengers, BART officials claimed that they had obtained information that the protestors
would be using their cell phones to coordinate the protest once on BART's train platforms. 117
Moreover, BART believed that such individuals had been instructed to communicate the location
of police officers and their response times to perpetuate the demonstration. 118 This information
led BART to conclude that the planned protest constituted a "serious and imminent threat to the
safety of BART passengers and personnel and the safe operation of the BART system ...." 119
This explanation, however, does not satisfy the Brandenburg test because the protestors' speech
advocated for civil disobedience as opposed to imminent lawless action.
The BART flash mobbers used social media such as Facebook to organize and advocate
for the August 11th planned protest at BART's train stations. 120 In fact, a group known as "No
Justice, No Bart" created a Facebook page to recruit and organize support for the August 11th
flash mob protest. 121

Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that this advocacy was likely to

result in a protest on August II th. Despite this, the message that the protestors disseminated and
the actions that they advocated for were neither directed at nor likely to produce imminent
lawless action as defmed by the Brandenburg doctrine and the Ninth Circuit.
First, BART protestors were advocating for the reform and/or the disbandment of BART
PD and not for imminent lawless action. 122 The protestors' speech was directed at affecting
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change by calling the public's attention to BART PD's questionable tactics and unrestrained use
of deadly force. 123 In response, BART will likely argue that the protestors encouraged the use of
illegal means to accomplish this goal, thereby bringing the speech within the ambit of lawless
action. This argument, however, is without merit because, as the Ninth Circuit held in White,
illegality does not necessarily imply lawless action. 124 BART's trepidations about the August
11th planned protest were largely based on the previous July 11th flash mob protest. 125 Although

the July 11th flash mob protest was extremely disruptive, the protest itself did not rise to the level
of tumultuous or violent. 126 In fact, when asked about this protest, BART's spokesman Linton
Johnson acknowledged, "Nobody was hurt." 127 In addition, news reports indicate that the
protestors employed nonviolent tactics such as picketing, chanting, and blocking access to
trains. 128 As a result, although the protestors' tactics can be appropriately characterized as law
breaking, breaking the law-albeit in a peaceful manner-is a key characteristic of civil
disobedience. 129 Therefore, the planned August 11th flash mob protest likely would have resulted
in civil disobedience as opposed to lawless action.
Ultimately, based on the previous flash mob protest, BART had no reason to believe that
the August 11th protest would become tumultuous or violent. Consequently, the August 11
planned protest was comparable to civil disobedience and was not likely to incite or produce
imminent lawless action as is required by the Brandenburg Doctrine.
III.
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Although certain flash mob protests are considered protected speech under the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that "[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible
in all places and at all times." 130 As a result, to decide whether protected speech is permissible, a
court must determine the type of forum that the speaker is attempting to access. 131

This

determination establishes whether "the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property
to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other
purposes." 132 This evaluation is crucial because depending on a property's character, the
Government is entitled to impose various limitations upon a speaker. 133

To facilitate this

analysis, the Supreme Court has divided property into three distinct forums: (1) the traditional
public forum; (2) the Government-designated public forum; and (3) the nonpublic forum. 134
A. The Traditional Public Forum
Traditional public forums include streets, parks, and all other types of property that "have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public
questions." 135 As a result, the principal purpose of traditional public forums is the free exchange
of ideas. 136 Due to traditional public forums' historical commitment to free expression, the
Government may not exclude speakers from these forums unless the exclusion serves a
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"compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest." 137
Despite this stringent standard, the Government is entitled to enforce content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulations on speech, provided those regulations are "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant

government

interest,

and

leave

open

ample

alternative

channels

of

communication. " 138
In Arkansas Education Television Commission v. Forbes, the Supreme Court clarified
what property qualifies as a traditional public forum by rejecting "the view that [the] traditional
public forum status extends beyond [a property's] historical confines." 139 As a result, the
Supreme Court held that one must examine the history of a property to determine whether it has
been held open for expressive activity. 140 An example of the Court's application of the historical
confines standard is seen in United States v. American Library Association Inc., where the
Supreme Court considered whether the Internet constitutes a traditional public forum. 141 In

American Library, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of implementing an internet
website filter in a public library. 142 Applying the historical confines standard, the Court ruled
that because Internet access did not exist until recently, it had not "immemorially been held in
trust for the public" for purposes of free expression. 143 As a result, Internet access within a
public library does not meet the historical confines standard and is thereby not a traditional
public forum. 144
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Similar to American Library, in Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville., the Sixth Circuit
held that although certain aspects of the Internet conform to the definition of a traditional public
forum, it has not "time out of mind ... [been] used for purposes of ... communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." 145 Consequently, despite its conforming
characteristics, the Internet is not a public forum solely because of the historical confines
standard. As a result, the Internet illustrates the pitfalls associated with a rigid historical confines
standard.
B. The Government-designated Public Forum
The second category of forums-the Government-designated public forum-consists of
property that the Government explicitly opens to the public for expressive activity. 146 Similar to
traditional public forums, speakers may not be excluded from Government-designated public
forums unless the exclusion is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 147
Furthermore, Government-designated public forums are afforded the same protections regardless
of whether the Government voluntarily created the forum or was compelled to create the
forum. 148 Despite this, the Government is not obligated to indefinitely maintain the public
character of such forums. 149
A Government-designated public forum is not formed by mere inaction or by the
allowance of "limited discourse" in a particular area. 150 "Only by intentionally opening a
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nontraditional forum for public discourse" is a Government-designated public forum created. 151
Thus, in contrast to a traditional public forum, which is automatically open for public discourse
regardless of governmental intent, a Government-designated forum is only created through a
clear governmental intent to open property for public discourse. Moreover, to ascertain whether
a Governmental authority specifically opened property for free expression, a court will look to
the "policy and practice" of the particular agency or body. 152 In addition, courts will also look to
the nature of the property in question and its "compatibility with expressive activity to discern
the government's intent." 153
An example of a Government-designated public forum is seen in Widmar v. Vincent,

where the Supreme Court held that a state university created a public forum when it made certain
campus facilities available to registered student groups. 154

In Widmar, the university

unconstitutionally violated a student religious group's First Amendment rights by denying them
access to the university's facilities based on their desire to engage in religious worship and
discussion. 155 The Supreme Court held that the university's policy in accommodating registered
student group meetings evidenced a governmental intent to create a public forum. 156 As such,
the University was required to justify their exclusion of the religious group by proving that the
exclusion was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 157 Ultimately, the
University was unable to produce a compelling justification to carry this heavy burden. 158

Jd.
ld.
153
Jd. (holding that '~e nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity," a court is particularly
reluctant to rule the Government intended to create a public forum).
154
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
155
Jd.at 269.
156
Jd.at 268.
157
I d. at 270.
151

152

158Jd

In contrast, in American Library, the Supreme Court held that Internet access in a public
library is not a designated public forum because a "public library does not acquire Internet
terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves ...." 159
Rather, libraries provide "Internet access, not to

~encourage

a diversity of views from private

speakers,' but for the same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate research,
learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite and appropriate
quality." 160 Thus, because the Supreme Court found that the library provided Internet access
solely for information gathering, the library did not intend to designate its Internet access for
expression. 161

American Library is an example of the Court investigating the policy and

practices of a Governmental agency to ascertain an intent to create a public forum. Ultimately,
absent clear evidence of a governmental intent to create a public forum, courts will rule that the
forum is nonpublic under the First Amendment. 162
C. The Nonpublic Forum
When property does not qualify as a traditional public forum or a Government-designated
public forum, the property is considered a nonpublic forum. 163 Speech within nonpublic forums
receives the least amount of First Amendment protection and "[a]cess ... can be restricted as
long as the restrictions are 'reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely
because officials oppose the speaker's view."' 164 In addition, an access restriction to nonpublic
forums "need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable
limitation." 165 Furthermore, such restrictions may be based on "subject matter and speaker
159
160
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identity" so long as the restriction is reasonable with respect to the character of the forum and the
restriction is viewpoint neutral. 166 Thus, a speaker may not be excluded from a nonpublic forum
merely because the Government disagrees with his or her viewpoint on a subject that otherwise
is appropriate within the forum. 167
Additionally, courts will look to the nature ofthe property in question to determine if it is
a nonpublic forum. 168

Where "the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive

activity," a court is particularly reluctant to rule that the Government intended to create a public
forum. 169 This rule is consistent with the idea that the Government, like private property owners,
has the right to "preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated." 170 Despite this, even when property is characterized as nonpublic "it can still serve
as a forum for First Amendment expression if the expression is appropriate for the property and
is not incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 171 This
rule implies that excluding expressive activity that is consistent with the nature and activity of a
forum is unreasonable.
One example of a nonpublic forum is an airport terminal. 172 In International Society for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that airport terminals do not
constitute public forums because (1) "the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that
airports have historically been made available for speech activity," and (2) airports have not been
166
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"intentionally opened by their operators" for speech activity. 173 Furthermore, the distribution of
religious materials in airplane terminals, which was the challenged speech activity, was
inconsistent with the nature of the property as such distributions were likely to disrupt business
by causing passengers an unwanted inconvenience. 174 As a result, the Supreme Court concluded
that the terminals were nonpublic forums, and the challenged access restrictions were subject to a
reasonableness test. 175 Applying this reasonableness test, the Supreme Court held that because
solicitation has a disruptive effect on airport activities and causes unwanted passenger
inconvenience, excluding solicitation from the forum was reasonable, and thus constitutional. 176
In essence, the nonpublic forum operates as a catchall forum because all types of property
that do not qualify as traditional public forums or Government-designated public forums
necessarily fall into this category.
D. Beginning the Forum Analysis
To conduct a forum analysis, the most logical starting point is determining what the
relative forums are. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that a forum does not have to be tangible property. 177 Rather, a forum is
"defined in terms of the access sought by the speaker," and, as a result, a "particular channel of
communication [can] constitute [a] forum for First Amendment purposes." 178 Moreover, the
Supreme Court held that there are two types of access that speakers can seek-general access or
limited access. 179 A speaker seeks general access to public property when he or she attempts to
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utilize the entire property for speech purposes. 180 As a result, the forum encompasses the entire
property. 181 In contrast, "[i]n cases in which limited access is sought, [the Supreme Court has]
taken a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of
the government property." 182
For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the
speaker attempted to gain access to a public school's internal mail system and the teachers'
mailboxes. 183 As a result, the Supreme Court held that despite its lack of tangibility, the internal
mailing system, rather than the school, was the relevant forum. 184 1bis is an instance where a
speaker sought limited access. 185 Comparably, in Cornelius, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which was a charity drive aimed at federal employees, was
the relevant forum despite the CFC's designation as "a particular means of communication." 186
Similar to Perry, the Court took a more tailored, limited-access approach to identifying the CFC
as the relevant forum. 187
Therefore, a court identifies a forum by determining where a speaker is attempting to
gain access. 188 In addition, it is inconsequential whether the speaker is attempting to gain access
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to something that is tangible or intangible. 189 Finally, the scope of the forum ultimately depends
on whether the speaker is attempting to gain general or limited access to the property. 190
However, where a speaker attempts to access a means of communication, such as a social
network, a court should employ a limited access approach to identifying the forum. 191
E. Application to BART
1.) Identifying the Forum(s)

With respect to the August 11th planned protest, it is clear that the flash mobbers were
attempting to gain access to BART's train platforms. 192 This can be inferred by examining the
July 11th protest, which used BART's train platforms as the primary location for the
demonstration. 193 While the train platforms were an obvious forum, BART flash mobbers also
attempted to gain access to a particular channel of communication: BART's wireless-network
and, more specifically, the social media networks that it enables.
As is evident by its definition, flash mobs are intrinsically linked with social media. 194
Thus, the success of a flash mob protest is contingent upon how well flash mobbers can utilize
social media to organize and disseminate information to additional supporters. Consequently,
BART protestors likely relied on having the ability to access BART's wireless-network during
the planned protest. 195 Although the wireless-network is not tangible property like a park or a
sidewalk, the Supreme Court has held that a means of communication can be a forum for First
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Amendment purposes. 196 As a result, the BART situation is comparable to Cornelius and Perry,
where the relevant forums were also intangible means of communication. 197 As such, BART's
wireless-network qualifies as a forum. 198
Once the forums are identified, a court must determine what type of access is sought:
general or limited. 199 BART will likely argue that the protestors sought general access to the
property, and therefore, the forum encompassed BART's train stations as a whole.

This

argument, however, is unjustified as the July 11th protest merely took place on BART's train
platforms.200 According to the Supreme Court, when a speaker seeks such limited access a court
may take a more tailored, piecemeal approach to determining the appropriate forum. 201

In

contrast, when a speaker attempts to access a property in its entirety, the forum encompasses the
whole property? 02 Additionally, a court should take a tailored, limited access approach when a
means of communication-such as BART's wireless-network-is implicated?03 In the instant
matter, the BART protestors merely attempted to access a specific location and network within
BART's train stations? 04 Consequently, the access sought was limited, and a court should take a
tailored approach to determining the scope of the forum.
Using a tailored approach, a court will certainly find that BART's platform areas
constitute a forum. As for the second possible forum-BART's wireless-network-free speech
activists may be argue that under a limited access approach, this analysis must be tailored even
further. During flash mobs, protestors only seek access to social media networks, such as instant
196
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messaging, Twitter, and Facebook, to disseminate information, communicate with one another,
and recruit new supporters.205 Consequently, flash mobbers do not attempt to utilize most of the
other functions and capabilities that wireless-networks offer. Thus, it is not unreasonable for
flash mobbers to contend that the relevant forum is the social media networks within BART's
wireless-network rather than BART's wireless-network as a whole. Although this is a logical
argument, a court may dismiss it for being overly narrow.
In sum, there are likely two forums in this situation: (1) BART's train platforms and (2)

BART's wireless-network and/or the social media networks that it provides.
2.) BART's Train Platforms are Nonpublic Forums
BART's train platforms are likely nonpublic forums and, as a result, restrictions on
speech in these areas are subject to a reasonableness test. First, BART's train platforms are not
traditional public forums because the platforms' principal purpose is to provide for convenient
and cheap public transportation rather than the free exchange of ideas. 206
Moreover, BART's train platforms are comparable to the forums in both Gannett v.
Metropolitan Transport Authority and Krishna. In Gannett, the Second Circuit ruled that the

New York Mass Transit Authority (MTA) subway platforms were not traditional public forums
because they were not primarily "used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought
between citizens, and discussing public questions."207 Similarly, in Krishna, the Supreme Court
held that airplane terminals are not traditional public forums because they are not traditionally
made available for speech activity. 208 Thus, because BART's train platforms are analogous to
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both the MTA platforms in Gannett and the airport terminal in Krishna, BART's train platforms
will likely be denied the status of traditional public forum.
In addition, there is no evidence that BART officials opened or designed their platforms
for expression or discourse, which is required to establish a Government-designated public
forum? 09 This is evident in BART's explicit rules governing the time, place, and manner of
expressive activities in their stations:
For more than 25 years, BART has had a policy regarding the
exercise of First Amendment free speech rights in areas of its
stations where it can be done safely and without interference with
BART's primary mission of providing safe, efficient and reliable
public transportation services. To implement this policy, BART
has designated the areas of its stations that are accessible to the
general public without the purchase of tickets as unpaid areas that
are open for expressive activity upon issuance of a permit subject
to BART's rules. To protect public safety and provide safe and
efficient public transportation, BART has restricted access to the
"Paid" and "Platform" areas of its stations to BART station
employees and ticketed passengers who are boarding, exiting or
waiting for BART trains. 210
Thus, BART did not intentionally open its paid and platform areas for free expression.
Furthermore, the character and nature of BART's train platforms is not conducive to
expressive activity. 211
transportation. 212

BART's train platforms are intended for fast and convenient public

Such objectives require that the platforms remain uncluttered and easily

navigable so as to enable passengers to easily board and exit trains? 13 As a result, allowing an
expressive activity-such as a flash mob protest-in these areas would likely frustrate BART's
purpose by creating platform congestion and unwanted inconveniences for BART passengers.214
Moreover, congested train platforms expose BART passengers and personnel to certain safety
209
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risks.Z 15

Consequently, as the Supreme Court held in Cornelius, where "the nature of the

property is inconsistent with expressive activity," the court is particularly reluctant to rule that
the Government intended to create a public forum.Z 16 Accordingly, BART's train platforms do
not constitute Government-designated public forums.
Thus, the platform areas fall into the catch-all category: nonpublic forums. As a result,
any speech exclusion that BART places on their platform areas is subject to a reasonableness
test.Z 17

Under the particular circumstances that BART officials were presented with, their

shutdown of wireless service to disrupt the effectiveness of the planned flash mob protest was
reasonable as to their train platforms.218
BART officials were concerned that the planned August 11th flash mob protest would
have detrimentally affected its commuters? 19 Using the July 11th flash mob protest as their
guidepost, BART officials believed that the planned protest would result in partial and complete
station closures, significant train delays, and the blocking of commuter access to trains. 220
Comparable to Krishna, where the Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for airport
officials to exclude solicitors from its terminals due to the unwanted inconvenience that solicitors
created, BART officials were reasonable in attempting to minimize inconveniences on their train
platforms.Z21 In addition, this case is distinguishable from Gannett?22 Unlike the solicitation of
newspapers on train platforms, which is considered consistent with the normal activity of train
platforms, a flash mob protest is inconsistent with the intended purpose of a train platform: the
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fast and efficient transportation of passengers.223 Therefore, because BART's restriction was
intended to facilitate the suppression of the planned flash mob, which was clearly inconsistent
with the nature of its train platforms, the wireless shutdown was a reasonable tactic.
Although shutting down wireless service is not the only alternative or even the most
reasonable alternative to ensuring passenger and personnel safety, the Supreme Court does not
require as much.224 Under the reasonableness standard for nonpublic forums, a restriction "need
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."225
Additionally, the exclusions must be viewpoint neutral. 226

In this situation, passenger and

personnel safety and convenience motivated BART's wireless shutdown?27 As a result, the
exclusion was not based upon censoring the flash mob protestors' viewpoint.

Ultimately,

BART's wireless shutdown was a reasonable limitation on flash mobbers' access to their train
platforms, thereby making the restriction constitutional in this context.
3.) BART's Wireless and Social Media Networks are Traditional Public Forums
In contrast to BART's train platforms, BART's wireless-network and the social media

networks that it enables are traditional public forums for First Amendment purposes. The most
notable counter-argument against this categorization is that wireless technology, including
Internet access and cell phone service, is a relatively recent development. 228 As a result, BART
will argue that wireless technology is not sufficiently entrenched in history to be considered a
traditional public forum?29
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Although it is questionable whether BART's wireless-network passes the historical
confines standard, it is important to note that the standard is extremely unworkable and should
not be treated as dispositive. Since the creation of the historical confines standard in Forbes, the
Supreme Court has applied the standard rigidly, maintaining that traditional public forum status
will not be extended to those forums where such history is lacking.230 Recent developments in
technology such as mobile social media networks, however, have exposed the need to abrogate
this rigid and untenable historical confines standard. First, the historical confmes standard is
unworkable because no case law has addressed when a forum has been around long enough to be
considered "immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions."231
Consequently, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine when or how a forum
satisfies this test. Thus, the indefmiteness of the historical confmes standard effectively creates
an exclusive and unchanging category of traditional public forums-public streets and parks?32
Additionally, the shortcomings of the historical confines standard are exposed when
applied to forums such as interactive social media networks. Social media networks such as
Facebook, Twitter, interactive Wikis, blogs, and instant messaging are almost entirely devoted to
''communicating thought between citizens," "discussing public questions," and free expression in
general, which are the primary purposes of traditional public forums. 233 These social media
networks foster an essential principle of the First Amendment as they strengthen public discourse
by creating a generally accessible forum for individuals from different backgrounds and
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geographic locations to exchange their thoughts, opinions, and ideologies. Furthermore, with the
development of 3G and 4G wireless data technology, which enables Internet access and social
networking almost anywhere, individuals can perpetually access this forum and take part in an
ongoing dialogue?34 In Putnam, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged these benefits, finding that
"[a]spects of cyberspace may, in fact, fit into the public forum category."235 Over the eleven
years since the Putnam decision, cyberspace has advanced to the point where these aspects have
increased exponentially.
The benefits to free speech that social networking technology engenders is not
diminished merely because the technology was recently developed. It is nearly impossible to
rationalize why social networking technology should not be considered a public forum when it
squarely fits into the Supreme Court's definition of a traditional public forum: "'traditional public
fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent."236 Thus, the rapid
development of social networks exposes the arbitrariness of the historical confmes standard.
Ultimately, the historical confines standard frustrates the central function of the forum analysisto ensure that constitutionally protected speech within forums devoted to public discourse is
adequately protected.237 As a result, technological innovations in communication and expression
like social networking are not adequately protected under the current interpretation of the law?38
Regardless of whether a court chooses to treat the historical confines standard as
dispositive, there is a possibility that BART's wireless-network will be considered a traditional
public forum nonetheless. It has been nearly a decade since the Supreme Court last considered
234
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whether the Internet constitutes a traditional public form? 39 Over this time, the Internet has
played an increasingly important role in free expression and public discourse?4

° Furthermore,

the Internet was frrst created in 1969, and became widely used for personal telecommunication
by the mid-1990s. 241 Thus, the Internet has now been in existence for over forty years and has
been used for discourse and expression for nearly twenty years. 242

As a result, it is not

unreasonable to conclude that the Internet now has a sufficiently long history and association
with free expression to satisfy the historical confines standard.
Provided the wireless-network is found to be a traditional public forum, the next step is
to determine whether BART's wireless shutdown was sufficiently justified?43

Usually, a

restriction on traditional public forums must serve a "compelling state interest [that] . . . is
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."244 If the restriction is content neutral and only regulates
the time, place, and manner of the expression, however, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
restriction was "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [left] open
ample alternative channels of communication."245
"To determine if a restriction is content neutral, 'the principal inquiry in speech cases ...
is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys."'246
consideration.

Under this test, "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling

A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is

deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
239
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others."247

Thus, a restriction is content-based when something points "decisively to a

motivation based on the subject matter, or content, of the speaker's message."248
For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court held that a city's
"sound-amplification guideline" was not targeted at the message or content of an anti-racism
concert.249 Rather, the regulation was justified because the city merely wanted to control noise
levels and maintain the tranquil character of the city.250 The Supreme Court concluded that this
justification was entirely unrelated to the content of the concert, and, as a result, was a contentneutral restriction. 251
Applying this to BART's restriction, the wireless shut down was likely content neutral.
BART's principal motivation for shutting down service was to facilitate its security force's
ability to suppress the planned flash mob to ensure the convenience and safety of BART
passengers.252 As a result, BART's restriction was 'justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech" because there are no indications that BART was attempting to censor the
flash mobbers' message?53 Presumably, BART would have employed similar tactics had they
been notified of a comparable protest expressing the opposite view?54 Moreover, the wireless
shutdown constitutes a time, place, and manner restriction because BART only shut down
wireless service to its train platforms for a temporary period of time. 255 For instance, in many
other areas of BART's train stations, such as "the street level and at all above-ground ... stations
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and trackways," wireless service was fully available?56 Therefore, the wireless shutdown was
likely a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on expression.
To justify a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, the restriction must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."257 BART's interest in disabling its wireless-network was primarily
the safety and convenience of its passengers.258 In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, the Supreme Court held that the government has a compelling interest in preserving public

safety. 259 Because the "significant government interest" standard is less stringent than the
compelling interest standard, BART has a significant Government interest in ensuring the safety
of its passengers and personnel.260
Next, it must be determined whether BART's wireless shut down was narrowly tailored
to serve its significant Government interest in the safety of its passengers and personnel. For
content neutral regulations, "[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more
than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy."261 "A complete ban can be narrowly
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted
evil."262 For example, in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court
upheld a regulation that proscribed all signs on public property because the Government had a
significant interest in maintaining the aesthetic nature of such property.263 As a result, the
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proscription was justified because it only restricted the type of speech that it was designed to
prevent. 264
Applying this to BART, BART's wireless shutdown was a complete proscription as it
completely excluded all speech in the wireless-network forum. 265 Thus, for BART to adequately
justify its actions, the shutdown cannot restrict more speech than it was designed to prevent.266
Once again, BART's motive for instituting the wireless shutdown is crucial to this analysis.
BART's motive for shutting down its wireless-network was to disrupt communication between
flash mobbers once they were on the train platforms? 67 Specifically, BART attempted to restrict
speech relaying information regarding police locations and response time as well as speech
aimed at recruiting and bolstering support for the flash mob. 268 BART's restriction's scope,
however, was far more expansive, as it proscribed any and all speech within the wirelessnetwork forum. Thus, the wireless shutdown fails the narrowly tailored prong of the test because
the restriction's scope limited considerably more expression than it was meant to preclude.
In addition, BART's restriction did not leave ample alternative channels of
communication open. The constitutionality of a regulation or restriction depends on whether it
allows for alternate avenues of communication. 269

In the instant case, BART's wholesale

wireless shutdown completely prevented all avenues of communication within the wirelessnetwork forum? 70 BART will likely argue that it provided other avenues of communication,
including access to passenger courtesy phones, which are located in the platform area?71 These
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264
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phones provide "direct communication with Station Agents."272 In addition, BART will likely
assert that it provided for two intercoms on each car, which allow passengers to contact BART
personnel for assistance while on trains.273 Although the courtesy phones and train intercoms
constitute mediums for communication, they are not suitable avenues for expressive speech. As
a result, these substitutes are not an adequate alternative to the wireless-network, which provides
access to an everlasting dialogue committed to the free flow of ideas and expression.
Ultimately, although BART's wireless shutdown served a significant government
interest (public safety), the complete proscription on speech within the wireless-network forum
was not narrowly tailored and did not provide for ample alternative means of communication?74
As a result, the wireless shutdown will likely be ruled unconstitutional.
If a court refuses to extend traditional public forum status to BART's wireless-network,
it will probably be considered a nonpublic forum. Although the wireless-network enables public
discourse and allows for free expression, there is no evidence that BART intentionally opened its
wireless-network for expressive speech. Similar to American Library, where the Supreme Court
found that a public library's Internet access was intended to facilitate information gathering
rather than free expression, BART provides wireless service to its platform areas for passenger
convenience and safety. 275 Thus, comparable to American Library, a court will most likely rule
that BART's wireless-network is a nonpublic forum. Despite this, if BART intended for their
wireless-network to ensure passenger safety, there is a peculiar contradiction: BART both
provided and shut down its wireless-network for safety purposes. Such a glaring inconsistency
may cut against the reasonableness of BART's actions. Nonetheless, a court will likely follow
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the same reasoning outlined in This Comment in Part III.E.2 and hold that the wireless shutdown
was a reasonable restriction on expression.
Nevertheless, wireless and social media networks should be considered traditional public
forums. If the Supreme Court decides to espouse this view, speech within these forums will
receive the utmost protection under the First Amendment. Consequently, flash mob protests will
reap the benefits of such a designation.
IV.

Prior Restraints Analysis

Courts must also consider unconstitutional prior restraints on speech when analyzing
social media restrictions during flash mob protests. The Supreme Court has defined a prior
restraint as an "administrative and judicial order forbidding certain communications when issued
in advance of the time that such communications are to occur."276 Because prior restraints
punish speech before the speech has occurred, they are greatly disfavored by the courts, and are
thereby presumptively unconstitutiona1?77

In fact, in Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart, the

Supreme Court stated, "The thread running through all [prior restraint] cases is that prior
restraints on speech are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
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rights."278 In addition, the temporary nature of a prior restraint does not make the restraint any
less offensive to the First Amendment. 279
Before conducting a prior restraints analysis, it is important to understand the difference
between a prior restraint and a subsequent punishment. For example, in Alexander v. United

States, the Supreme Court ruled that a court-ordered forfeiture of funds was not a prior restraint
on speech because the order constituted a punishment for the defendant's past illegal acts. 280 In
response to this, the defendant argued that the court order operated as a prior restraint because it
precluded his entry into the adult entertainment business?81 The Supreme Court dismissed this
claim, holding that the order did not prevent the defendant from using untainted assets to finance
his entry into the prospective field.

282

Thus, because the order merely called for the seizure of

the defendant's tainted assets, it operated as a subsequent punishment for the defendant's past
wrongful acts rather than a prior restraint on his forthcoming speech? 83 Moreover, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was irrelevant that nearly all of the defendant's assets were seized under the
order.284
Once it is determined that a speech restriction operates as a prior restraint, a court must
determine whether the restraint is justified.285 Governments may justify a prior restraint by
demonstrating that the First Amendment does not protect the restricted speech.286 To meet this
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exception, a flash mob protest must fail to convey a message that is likely to be understood by
the audience. 287 An example of such a flash mob is a flash robbery. 288 If the Government fails
to prove that the speech falls outside the protections of the First Amendment, then the Supreme
Court applies the following three-prong test to determine whether the prior restraint is justified:
(1) the nature of the speech in question must be likely to impair the rights of others; (2) there
cannot be alternative measures that may mitigate the anticipated harm associated with allowing
the speech; and (3) the prior restraint must be an effective recourse to preventing the threatened
danger.289 Although originally tailored to address prior restraints on news publications, the court
can easily apply the test to flash mob protests.
The first prong of this test may be satisfied even if it is speculative whether the rights of
others will be impaired by the speech.290 However, the conclusion that the rights of others may
be impaired must be reasonable.2 91 For example, in Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court ruled
that it was reasonable for the judge to conclude that "pervasive pretrial publicity" of an
impending case may impair the defendant's right to a fair trial. 292 Although such harm was
speculative, the Supreme Court held that the judge's "conclusion as to the impact of such
publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity speculative, dealing as he was with factors
unknown and unknowable."293 Therefore, the judge's temporary injunction on pretrial news
coverage satisfied the first prong of the test. 294
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The second prong of the test asks whether there were any alternatives that could have
mitigated the hann associated with the particular speech?95 In Nebraska Press, the Supreme
Court found that there were numerous viable alternatives to altogether enjoining pretrial news
coverage?96 Such alternatives included postponing the trial, moving the trial to a less exposed
venue, and clearly and emphatically instructing the jurors of their duties? 97 The Supreme Court
ruled that the Government did not adequately refute these alternatives because there was no
finding that the alternatives "would not have protected [the defendant's] rights."298 This analysis
illustrates that the party seeking to enforce the prior restraint bears the burden of disproving the
efficacy of possible alternative measures?99
The last prong of the Nebraska Press test examines whether the prior restraint will
effectively prevent the threatened danger. 300 In analyzing the third prong in Nebraska Press, the
Supreme Court examined the location of the trial, most notably the small size of the community
(850 people).301 Due to the community's small size, the Supreme Court concluded that rumors
and information concerning the defendant's trial likely would have permeated the town
regardless of whether there were any news accounts being printed or broadcast.302 Thus, because
certain facts of the case would likely surface irrespective of the pretrial news coverage, the
restriction on news publication was not an effective means of restraining a community from
discussing the facts of the trial. 303 Ultimately, Nebraska Press embodies how much courts
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disfavor anticipatory restraints on speech. As a result, authorities that preemptively restrict flash
mob protests will likely have an extremely difficult time justifying their actions.
A. BART's Wireless-network Shutdown Qualifies as an Unjustified Prior Restraint
BART's wireless-network shutdown strongly resembles a prior restraint because, on its
face, the shutdown appears to restrict speech "in advance of the time that such communications
were to occur."304
BART could argue that the wireless shutdown is comparable to Alexander, where the
Supreme Court found no prior restraint because the injunction did not restrict the defendant from
engaging in the expressive activity he desired. 305 Rather, the Supreme Court ruled that the order
was a subsequent punishment that limited the type of funds that the defendant could use to
finance his entry into the adult entertainment industry.306
BART's wireless shutdown is distinguishable from Alexander. First, BART's wireless
shutdown did not constitute a subsequent punishment for the July 11th protest. To begin, there
was never an official finding that the July 11th protest required or deserved reprisal. 307 Although
BART publically condemned the July 11th protest, no arrests or judicial determinations were
ever made regarding whether the protest warranted punishment.308 In addition, the wireless
shutdown does not fit the characteristics of a punishment. Foremost, the shutdown was grossly
overbroad as it "punished" numerous people who fall outside the class of alleged
transgressors. 309 To illustrate, the shutdown punished everyone on BART's train platforms
regardless of whether they participated in the July 11th protest.310 Secondly, BART's alleged
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punishment sought to reprimand an unidentifiable group of individuals. Because BART did not
possess a definitive list of people who participated in the July 11th protest, it was impossible to
direct a punishment strictly toward flash mobbers. Moreover, the wireless shutdown was not an
effective punishment because it did not prevent or deter the type of behavior it sought to
punish-the endangerment of BART passengers. 311 Although a wireless shutdown can limit the
effectiveness of perpetuating a flash mob protest, it is not meant to prevent a protest from
occurring. Although the August 11th planned protest did not occur, it is unreasonable to believe
the shutdown was the sole reason. As a result, the wireless shutdown does not constitute a
subsequent punishment because (1) there was never a determination that the July 11th protest
warranted retribution, and (2) the shutdown does not meet the criteria of a punisbment. 312
In addition, BART will may contend that the wireless shutdown was similar to Alexander

in that it did not restrain the flash mobbers from speaking out against BART; it merely restricted
where they could protest.

This argument fails because the primary purpose of the wireless

shutdown was to restrict flash mobbers' access to BART's wireless-networks rather than the
train platforms. 313 This is evidenced through BART's letter of explanation to its passengers on
August 20, 2011:
The August 10 intelligence revealed that the individuals would be
giving and receiving instructions to coordinate their activities via
cell phone after their arrival on the train platforms at more than one
station. Individuals were instructed to text the location of police
officers so that the organizers would be aware of officer locations
and response times. The overall information about the planned
protest led BART to conclude that the planned action constituted a
serious and imminent threat to the safety of BART passengers and
personne1 ....314
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As a result, BART fully expected the August 11th flash mob to take place. Thus, the primary
purpose for the wireless shutdown was to disrupt the communication of protestors once they
were on the platform, not to restrict the protestors' access to the platform.315 Consequently, this
case is distinguishable from Alexander because BART, motivated by speculative "intelligence,"
attempted to restrict speech that had not yet occurred through disabling its wireless-network.
Since the wireless shutdown constituted a prior restraint and the August 11th flash mob
protest qualifies as protected expressive conduct, a court should apply the Nebraska Press threepronged test. 316 The first prong of the Nebraska Press test asks whether the nature of the speech
in question is likely to impair the rights of others.317 BART likely satisfies this prong as it is
reasonable to believe that the August 11th protest would cause significant congestion on BART's
train platforms.318 Additionally, such congestion could lead to possible safety problems.319
Although this fear is speculative, the Supreme Court has ruled that reasonable speculation does
not defeat the first prong of the Nebraska Press test. 320
The second prong of the Nebraska Press test inquires whether there are any other
measures that may mitigate the harm associated with allowing the speech.321 As applied to the
BART situation, BART would have the burden of proving that there are no less restrictive
alternatives to ensuring passenger safety. 322 One possible alternative to the wireless shutdown
was to increase security in the platform areas. In response to this, BART will likely assert that
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they increased security by 120 extra uniformed officers. 323 To carry their burden, BART will
have to demonstrate that an increase in security alone was inadequate to protect their passengers
and personnel. 324 This is not easy to prove because it is reasonable to believe that employing
ample security would mitigate the detrimental effects of protestors using social media to
perpetuate the flash mob?25 As a result, a wireless shutdown would only marginally help BART
officers suppress the flash mob, making the tactic largely unnecessary.
Though extreme, a second possible alternative would be to temporarily restrict all
passengers from the platform areas. A court would likely hold that this tactic is unreasonable
because the flash mob was meant to occur during afternoon rush hour. Ultimately, however,
BART will encounter much difficulty in attempting to carry its burden and will likely fail the
second prong.
Furthermore, BART will also have trouble satisfying the third prong of the Nebraska
Press test, which questions "the likely efficacy of a prior restraint to prevent the threatened

danger."326 Shutting down wireless service is not an effective way of ensuring public safety
because it does not adequately safeguard against a flash mob protest actually occurring. As a
result, the safety of BART passengers and personnel would be endangered notwithstanding the
wireless shutdown. Although a court now has the benefit of hindsight and knows that the August
11th planned protest did not take place, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the wireless
shutdown was the only reason for this. As mentioned above, disabling wireless service was
primarily intended to disrupt the protestors' communication during the protest.327

This

restriction in no way effects the organization or planning of the flash mob. Thus, a wireless
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shutdown merely disturbs how effectively a protest is carried out. As a result, irrespective of the
wireless shutdown, BART's train platforms were likely to be extremely congested, thereby
manifesting the danger BART sought to avoid. BART will contend that the wireless-network
mitigated these dangers by aiding security's ability to suppress the flash mob. Despite this, a
wireless shutdown does not adequately ''prevent the threatened danger" because passenger safety
is no less vulnerable as a result.
Ultimately, BART will most likely fail to carry its burden, rendering the wireless
shutdown unconstitutional under the Nebraska Press test.

Therefore, the BART situation

demonstrates that Governmental agencies that institute anticipatory restrictions on flash mob
protests, most notably restrictions on social media access, have an extremely difficult time
justifying their actions.
V.

Conclusion

Not all flash mobs receive First Amendment protections.328 To receive constitutional
protection, a flash mob must attempt to express a message that is likely to be understood by those
who view it. 329 As a result, flash mobs such as flash robberies will not receive constitutional
protection because they do not convey a message. Flash mob protests, on the other hand, almost
always aim to convey a message, and, thus, will generally be entitled to receive some First
Amendment protections.330
Despite this, the government has more leeway in restricting expressive conduct.331
Therefore, in examining the constitutionality of restrictions on flash mob protests, one must
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determine the flash mob's speech and "nonspeech" elements. 332 Once these are determined,
courts will examine whether the governmental restriction on the flash mob is intended to regulate
the protest's communicative elements. 333 In the event that the restriction is intended to restrain
the nonspeech elements of the flash mob, the Government's interest in restraining those elements
must outweigh any incidental impingements on the speaker's protected expressive message. 334
Ultimately, because the 0 'Brien test is extremely fact sensitive, there is no bright line rule
stating whether a restriction on a flash mob protest violates the First Amendment.335 Thus, flash
mob protests must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, because flash mob protests almost always attempt to access wireless and
social media networks,336 flash mob protests should receive the protections of traditional public
forums. Although a court has yet to rule that wireless-networks constitute traditional public
forums, 337 the BART situation embodies why wireless and social media networks deserve the
utmost protection under the First Amendment.

Thus, this Comment recommends that the

historical confmes doctrine338 be downgraded from a dispositive standard to a merely persuasive
factor. Ultimately, under this proposed construction, limitations on a flash mob protests' access
to social media networks should only be permissible in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
Lastly, prior restraints on flash mob protests must rebut an extremely heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality, especially when that restriction attempts to limit a flash mob protests'
access to social media. 339 As a result, unless the prior restraint is associated with an important
governmental interest and is used as an absolute last resort, a court will likely fmd that the
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restriction is unconstitutional.340

Ultimately, if a flash mob protest is entitled to First

Amendment protection, its fundamental relationship to social media is its greatest defense
against Governmental restrictions.
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